The Auxiliary Fire Service was a consequence of the Air Raid Precautions Act of 1937. With Royal Assent granted on 22 December (the Monarch's approval of new legislature) establishment of units of the Auxiliary Fire Service was incumbent on relevant authorities from New Years Day 1938.

AFS units were attached to the Island's established fire brigades and became the responsibility of the relevant Chief Officer of the Brigade to plan and deliver their basic training. Although the AFS was a national effort, it was backed with little central coordination and as a consequence AFS units were subject to the whim of the regular fire brigades to which they were attached - and who initially, were resentful of the auxiliary firemen who were better recompensed for their time than the veterans of the brigades. Local evidence shows that several Isle of Wight brigade veterans resigned and immediately volunteered for the AFS, presumably for this reason.

AFS units were recruited at such a rate to become far superior in number than that of the brigade to which they were attached. When Max Heller was appointed to the role of Chief Officer of Ryde Fire Brigade in 1937 he had a nominal roll of 18 men under his command. Within two years his scope of responsibility had increased tenfold with the recruitment of auxiliary firemen within IW ARP District 2, centred on Ryde with more than two-hundred men recruited.

The same happened across the Island within the six ARP districts, which for clarity, are listed below.

ARP District 1 - Newport - Gatcombe, Shorwell and Arreton.
ARP District 2 - Ryde - Fishbourne, Binstead, Ashey, Bembridge, Seaview, St Helens
ARP District 3 - Cowes
ARP District 4 - Sandown-Shanklin - Brading, Godshill, Newchurch, Lake, Alverstone
ARP District 5 - Ventnor - Chale, Niton
ARP District 6 - (Rural District) Freshwater - Brighstone, Shalfleet, Calbourne, Yarmouth, Totland

Above - Ryde's first batch of AFS recruits photographed in the garden of the London Hotel, 3 October 1938. To the left of the rear rank is Chief Officer Max Heller of Ryde Fire Brigade. Centre front row with the spectacles is the Mayor Henry Weeks. The only fireman positively identified in the image is Bill Barnett stood at the rear in the centre of the window, who went on to serve for many years after the war as Station Officer at Bembridge.

As the AFS developed and became supplied with its own equipment, most notably the mass production of trailer-mounted pumps, the auxiliaries began to take on a shape of their own, although still formally attached to a brigade. Rank structure followed recognised lines but other titles appeared in less formal usage, particularly that of Patrol Leader or Patrol Officer. There is some doubt as to whether a Patrol Leader/Officer was a formal rank or a role undertaken for a task of known duration.

When Cowes auxiliary fireman Frank Day was tragically drowned at Somerton Reservoir in April 1940, he was reported in the local press as Patrol Officer Day. The same appeared in the Civilian War Dead Roll of Honour published by the Imperial War Graves Commission in 1959. At the time of his death Frank Day and his colleagues were undertaking pump drills, not patrolling, so it seems possible that the title was a rank not a temporary role.

Use of the title suggests that the AFS didn't only dwell on stations, or remain on call from work and home, waiting for a turnout - they were actively patrolling their districts - why else have a Patrol leader?

Things fell into place when a Ryde family with substantial connections to firefighting in the Borough over many decades, leant me a copy of a booklet titled - Borough of Ryde I.W., Auxiliary Fire Brigade, Handbook of Instructions.

The booklet contained addresses and telephone numbers of the Borough Main Fire Station and Control Centre in addition to Auxiliary Fire Stations, Training Centre, Store, Trailer Pump Posts, Action Stations, Fire Posts and Turncocks.

This evidenced that even before war was declared the Borough's firefighting capability had expanded incomparably from one fire station to a total of ten different locations accommodating an operational firefighting capability. This takes no account of the other resources located across the wider area comprising District 2, in addition to twelve ARP posts.

Furthermore the booklet is, in the main, a set of orders for the routes of a series of patrols to be conducted.

By reference to a similar document published by the Newport Borough, it seems likely that these patrols were undertaken - as soon as possible after bombs have been dropped - which implies that this was not to be undertaken while the raid was actually in progress.

Action Stations are defined as a point in the route where a Patrol would muster, and wait for further instructions before continuing on their route - The object of dispersing the patrols at Action Stations is to ensure that, at the moment patrolling starts, the units are properly spaced on the route so that effective observation can be exercised at once over the whole route - suggesting that more than one patrol would be active within the same route at the same time.

Carisbrooke Castle Museum possess a copy of a similar document produced to dictate the patrolling of Newport. Both the Ryde and Newport versions include some basic information pertaining to pump drills. The latter version contains more details, such as guidance on how an incendiary bomb behaves, and how to deal with it, a list of hydrant locations throughout the town, locations of supplementary water supplies, the location of ARP posts in outlying areas and the standby positions of first aid parties and ambulances.

Above - 1939, A crew of Newport Auxiliary Firemen (identifiable by the donning of peaked caps) at the Cattle Market which was part-requisitioned for fire service use, with the Newport Fire Brigade Leyland Titan DDL 215.

The Newport handbook also included some particular instructions.

Office in charge of Patrol to note the following:-

Upon being intercepted by an Air Raid Warden or Fire Messenger and sent to an outbreak of fire, a brief report should be sent to Central Control Room Newport 2414 giving details of gear in use at outbreak. Failing to make contact with Central Control Room, and requiring further assistance, Phone Wootton Bridge 58 (Dial 68) or Newport 2307, asking for required assistance and giving brief details of outbreak.

Failing to contact with any of the above stations, despatch Fire Messenger to nearest Sub-station or Central Control Room.

When fire is extinguished report to Control Room and proceed on beat.

During an actual raid in the District, the Officer in charge is to proceed to the nearest Action Station and order his men to take cover, when the raid has passed over the District, to proceed on beat.

The following are examples of brief detailed messages to be sent to the Central Control Room upon being engaged at an outbreak:-

"No. A Patrol engaged on fire at Private House, No.1 Whitepit Lane, Front Room, First Floor, Motor Pump and one line of hose in use, no further assistance required."

"No. B Patrol engaged on fire on Ground and First Floors of No.6 High Street, Shop Premises, Living Quarters above, Stores at rear, Motor Pump and 2 lines of hose in use. Further assistance required."

Patrol maps

The original handbooks for the Newport and Ryde auxiliary firemen detailed the Patrol routes in a difficult to follow written format. Using Ordnance Survey digital mapping I have used the text to produce more easily understandable street mapping which is shown below. Click on the images to enlarge.

Newport

Begins and ends at the temporary fire station in the market place, Church Litten.

Ryde (including ARP district outliers)

Begins and ends at the Main Fire Station in Station Street.

Begins and ends at the auxiliary fire station in a requisitioned part of Brooke House.

Begins and ends at the Main Fire Station in Station Street.

Begins and ends at the auxiliary fire station in the requisitioned The Old Boathouse.

Begins and ends at the auxiliary fire station at the requisitioned Read's Garage, Simeon Street.

Begins and ends at a Trailer Pump Post, location cited as 'Fire Station (Stream - Well on Green, top of Station Road).

1939 AFS handbooks

The only copies of AFS handbooks I have discovered so far are those of Newport and Ryde, both issued in 1939.

Both versions contain the patrol routes in textual format, plus the addresses and contact numbers of various stations, sub-station and posts, addresses of ARP and First Aid Posts and a written drill for getting a trailer-pump to work.

The Newport version is more comprehensive and includes several other advisories in addition to a substantial list of hydrant locations, although one wonders if a marked street map might have been of more practical use as the location descriptions are a little cryptic in places.

Standing orders from the Newport handbook are copied below.

Officer in charge of patrol is to note the following

Upon being intercepted by an Air Raid Warden or Fire Messenger and being sent to an outbreak of fire, a brief report should be sent to Central Control Room, Newport 2414, giving details of gear in use at the outbreak. Failing to make contact with Central Control Room and requiring further assistance, Phone Wootton Bridge 58 (Dial 68) or Newport 2307, asking for required assistance and giving brief details of the outbreak.

Failing to contact with any of the above stations, despatch Fire Messenger to nearest Sub-station or Central Control Room.

When fire is extinguished report to Control Room and proceed on beat.

During an actual raid on the District, the Officer in charge is to proceed to the nearest Action Station and order his men to take cover, when raid has passed over the district, to proceed on beat.

The following are examples of brief detailed messages to be sent to the Central Control Room upon being engaged at an outbreak.

"No. A Patrol engaged on fire at Private House, No.1 Whitepit Lane, Front Room, First Floor, Motor Pump and one line of hose in use, no further assistance required."
"No. B Patrol engaged on fire on Ground and First Floors of No,.6 High Street, Shop Premises, Living Quarters above, Stores at rear, Motor Pump and 2 lines of hose in use. Further assistance required."

Incendiary Bombs

In the event of an incendiary attack from the air, the probability is that Fire Brigades and Fire Brigade Auxiliaries would, as a rule, be called upon to deal with fires resulting from the bombs rather than with the bombs themselves, and the firemen's technique for extinguishing a fire in a building or preventing its spread will generally be much the same whatever the nature of the bomb by which the building may of been set alight.

Patrol units may, however, be called upon to deal with a fire, while a bomb still remains active. In any case, it is necessary that the personnel of Fire Brigades should have some knowledge of the characteristics of the type of incendiary bomb known as 'kilo' magnesium or Electron bomb.

Other types of incendiary bombs might, of course, be used, but it is anticipated that the Electron bomb will form the commonest means of attack.

Electron bomb - description

The 1 Kilo (2lb 2oz) incendiary bomb consists of a thick walled tube of magnesium or the alloy known as 'electron' (which consists of a mixture of magnesium, about 90% with 10% aluminium). The tube or centre of the bomb is filled with 'Thermite', which is a mixture of iron-oxide and aluminium.

One end is closed by a magnesium or electron plug, enclosing the percussion fuse, which when the bomb is actuated, ignites the magnesium. The bomb is fitted with a tail to steady it in flight. It should be noted that the Thermite is not the main incendiary agent. The main incendiary material is the Electron casing, which melts, and burns away. The Thermite does however contribute to the incendiary effect; it burns for 30 to 60 seconds, with a temperature of about 2,500 centigrade throwing out sparks of molten metal over a radius of about 14 ft.

The pool of molten Electron produced by the melting of the outer casing of the bomb ignites and continues to burn at about 1,300 centigrade (without any appreciative spluttering) for a period of from 5 to 10 minutes, and may remain active for as long as twenty minutes or more. There is no explosive effect with this type of bomb.*

* Webmasters note - this was to change soon after commencement of the war. The Nazi's identified that British firefighters evidenced no fear of the 1kg incendiary bomb and were able to approach the device and contain its effect. As a result a random number of devices were fitted with an explosive charge - so as to create wariness and uncertainty. Sadly, the only evidenced example of this occurrence on the Isle of Wight led to the death of 16-year-old auxiliary messenger John Alfred Ferrari. On the night of 5 April 1941, he and an ARP Officer were smothering incendiary devices at Yards Hollow, Limerstone, when one exploded, send a shard of shrapnel through the boy's chest, killing him instantly.

Penetration

A, BY IMPACT

Roofs of reinforced concrete 5 ins. thick would resist penetration by these bombs, but most roofs of the commoner types would be penetrated by a bomb dropped from 5,000 ft or over.

B, BY BURNING

Floor boards of 1 inch finished thickness would be burned through in a few minutes by a bomb ignited on an unprotected floor. Lath and plaster would be burned through in a few seconds. Corrugated iron, 20 gauge, is just proof against penetration by burning.

Possible Incidence of Fires

By reason of the light weight of the bomb, larger numbers could be carried by hostile aircraft, and ten or more might be dropped together. This procedure might be adopted haphazardly without regard to particular objectives, the general effect culminating in several fires breaking out close together.

Methods of Control

As already pointed out, Fire Brigades would, in an emergency, be more concerned with extinguishing the fires caused by the bombs, than the bombs themselves, but if a bomb were still active on the arrival of a pump unit (this period of activity may continue for twenty minutes) a fire jet of 1/2 inch or over, should be employed.

A jet which can be kept directed on a Kilo Electron bomb may extinguish it, but immediately the jet hits the bomb the burning develops so rapidly, that an explosive effect takes place and small particles of burning Electron may be thrown as far as 25 ft, or the bomb might be driven away in front of the jet, still burning, and lodge in some inaccessible position where it could do little further harm as, by this time, the fire-stream would be effectively controlling the burning.

For detached fire parties equipped with hand appliances, fire parties in factories, and store premises similarly equipped and for householders, two methods of controlling this small bomb are available.

FIRST METHOD

Water applied to the bomb by a special nozzle delivering a fine spray of water from a stirrup pump will cause the bomb to burn away in about two minutes, instead of remaining active for close to twenty minutes. By applying the water in a spray, there is no dangerous explosion or scattering of the molten metal, and the spray also has a cooling effect on surrounding material. This special nozzle can be altered from spray to 1/8 inch by a push and pull valve. After burning away the bomb in this manner, the jet can be used to extinguish the surrounding fire caused by the bomb.

Water applied to the bomb in the ordinary way, even in the relatively quiescent stage, causes very violent spluttering and scattering of the burning metal to a considerable distance. While, therefore, water applied with sufficient force, and in quantity (a fire stream) may extinguish these bombs, members of the public and others using hand appliances, should use the second method of control (described below), if a special nozzle delivering spray is not available.

SECOND METHOD

If the bomb has fallen on a concrete floor, with or without wood blocks, on a brick or earth floor of a factory or similar flooring, where there is no readily inflammable material in the vicinity, and the bomb could with safety be left to burn itself out, this second method might be employed. The application of dry sand or foamed slag.

This can be applied most effectively with a Redhill sand container and long-handled scoop by removing the sand or foamed slag from the Redhill container with the scoop and well covering the bomb. The whole (sand and bomb) should then be drawn into the scoop, using the hoe which forms part of the scoop, and placed in the container. A hand pump may then be used for reducing the heat and smoke, facilitating approach to the bomb, but, for the reason already explained, the water should not be directed onto the bomb. After removal of the bomb any remaining fire could then be extinguished with water in the usual way.

A very broad general comparison may be drawn between the two methods, i.e., (1) spray and jet, and, (2) sand and jet as follows;

USING SPRAY

Only one appliance is required. By applying the spray the burning away of the bomb is facilitated, the resulting fire is checked much more quickly, and the material destroyed or damaged by fire is usually considerably less.

USING SAND OR FOAMED SLAG

Unless the fire has become serious, less water is required, and, if the bomb is burning on a floor which could not be affected, nothing more is required than to provide a good covering of sand or foamed slag. Approach can then be made and the bomb removed.

Regulations

Unauthorised use of AFS Uniform, Badges, Etc.

The wearing of the AFS uniform or badges by unauthorised persons is now an offence. Section 68 of the Civil Defence Act, 1939, is worded as follows;

"Any unauthorised person who uses or wears any uniform, medal, badge or emblem issued by or with the authority of the Minister for the use of persons engaged in any civil defence service, or any uniform, medal, badge or emblem which, by reason of its resemblance to any such uniform, medal, badge or emblem as aforesaid or otherwise, is designed to indicate that the user or wearer is engaged in a civil defence service, shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds."

Defence Regulations

Paragraph 1 of Regulation 28 gives to auxiliary firemen the same powers of entry and other powers with respect to fire extinction as are conferred on members of fire brigades by Section 14 (1) of the Fire Brigades Act, 1938, and makes it an offence to obstruct an auxiliary fireman engaged in the performance of his duty, as it is under Section 14 (2) of the Fire Brigades Act to obstruct a member of the fire brigade.

Under Regulation 28 it shall be deemed to be a condition of service of every person who has undertaken to give whole time service :-

Extract from Fire Brigades Act 1938

14. - (1) Any member of a fire brigade which provides local fire services under this Act being on duty, and any police constable may enter and if necessary break into any premises or place in which a fire has or is reasonably supposed to have broken out, or any premises of place which it is necessary to enter for the purpose of extinguishing a fire, without the consent of the owner or occupier thereof, and may do all such acts and things as they deem necessary for extinguishing fire or for protecting from fire any such premises or place or rescuing any person or property therein.

(2) At any fire the senior officer present of the fire brigade maintained for the borough or district in which the fire originates, or if any scheme or arrangements made under this Act provides that any other person shall have charge of the operations for the extinction of the fire, that other person, shall have the sole charge and control of all operations for the extinction of the fire including the fixing of the positions of fire engines and apparatus, the attaching of hose to any water pipes or water supply, and the selection of the parts of the building on fire or of adjoining buildings against which the water is to be directed, and may cause the water to be shut off from the mains and pipes of any borough or district in order to give a greater supply and pressure of water in the borough or district in which the fire occurs, and no authority, company, or person shall be liable to any penalty or claim by reason of the interruption of the water supply occasioned only by compliance with the provisions of this section.

Attendance of AFS Personnel at Peace Time Fires

There is no objection to the employment of AFS personnel to assist the regular fire brigade as part of their training or for the purpose of supplementing the brigade for dealing with exceptional fires, but the auxiliary personnel should be regarded as supplementary to, and not part of, the personnel required for the maintenance of an efficient brigade according to the normal peace time requirements.

Reporting of Fires

Where the fire services are organised on the patrol basis, the general practice on discovery of fire should be for the warden to endeavour to get in to touch with a patrol unit. If this is not practicable, and ready means are at hand for telephoning the nearest fire station, whether regular or auxiliary, such action should be taken. Failing this the occurrence should be reported to the Report Centre where the report will be transferred at once to the Fire Brigade Liaison Officer.

Action Station

The Action Station is the point on the actual patrol route at which patrol units and their crews would muster and await instructions or other occasion to patrol. The object of dispersing the patrols at action stations is to ensure that, at the moment patrolling starts, the units are properly spaced on the route so that effective observation can be exercised at once over the whole route.

Commencement of Patrolling

The object to be attained is to ensure that the patrol routes are brought under observation by patrol units as soon as possible after there is any risk of fires breaking out, i.e., as soon as possible after bombs have been dropped. There are two main methods for initiating the patrol, namely, on instructions issued to the patrol units by the Section Officer, or at the discretion of the Sub Officer in charge of the individual patrol units. In practice it would probably be necessary to combine the two methods, i.e., the Officer in charge of each fire station or auxiliary fire station should instruct all patrols in his section to commence patrolling as soon as circumstances require, and the Leading Fireman/Sub Officer in charge of each party should have discretion to commence patrolling, without instructions, if he is satisfied that occasion for action has arisen in his section. Experience at exercises has shown that instructions to units distributed on a patrol route can generally be conveyed as rapidly by means of motorcyclist messengers, one going in the direction of the patrolling and the other in the opposite direction, as by means of the telephone.