In 1996 my research into the history of the fire service, and by default the wartime civil defence service, was compelled by the discovery of an unpublished diary written by a teenaged fireman who served in the same town as the one to which I had been recruited more than fifty years later.

Discovering that the reason for his diary ending so suddenly was due to his death in a sustained aerial attack on the northerly point of the Isle of Wight in May 1942, I was compelled to understand what he was doing, how he died, and who killed him.

For many years my research took a sideways trajectory, discovering more destruction, tragedy and death wrought from the air. It was the chance discovery of another unpublished diary, and its meticulous translation from German to English (Enemy of the People), that offered a step forward in understanding the originators of the Luftwaffe attacks on parts of this island home that I have been fortunate enough to enjoy in more peaceful times.

Each file, differed in content, but evidenced a similar pattern, and these I have used to substantiate with facts the matters concerning several raids located elsewhere on this website.

The reports were submitted by investigators, who appeared to have been in the employ of the constabulary, after they had been dispatched to the site of a raid to record details of the effect, always accompanied by facts, figures and explanative text, and sometimes including photography, sketches, maps, and plans.

Particular emphasis was placed on facilities provided for civil protection – Morrison table shelters, Anderson shelters, surface shelters, trench shelters. I was therefore convinced that R&E’s role was to report on the efficacy of protective measures.

I wasn’t incorrect, but their entire role was so much more. I discovered a reference to Mr A.R. Astbury and his written work The History of the Research and Experiments Department, Ministry of Home Security, 1939 – 1945.  I typed the title into a Google search bar and expected to instantly find a copy – if I had, I may have dwelled on it and revisited it later. The fact that it seemed impossible to find motivated me to find out why.

I wondered, given the journey I had taken to find it, and its evident lack of exposure in a world of high-speed digitised access to virtually anything, if I was the first to open the folder in earnest since it was officially unlocked at a time my shorts-clad legs were dashing about West Street schoolyard to the cry of British Bulldog.

Due to the book not being published, no biography of A.R. Astbury is included. By means of online genealogical research I discovered a few notables by that name and from these I am confident I have identified the correct man.

Born on 5 June 1880 and baptised at St. Mark’s Chapel, London, Arthur Ralph Astbury studied at St. Peter’s College, Westminster from 1894-1897 and undertook scientific training at the Royal Indian Engineering College at Coopers Hill, Egham, 1897-1900, before being proposed for membership of the Institution of Civil Engineers on 28 July 1906 while resident in Lahore. Five months later he relocated to Torrentium Cottage, Shimla. He married Friede Hildegard Vonschonberg at Bengal, in 1908. These is no evidence of the couple having children.

On 2 January 1933, he was appointed as a Companion to the chivalric Order of the Star of India, proclaimed by Queen Victoria in 1861 as follows - The Queen, being desirous of affording to the Princes, Chiefs and People of the Indian Empire, a public and signal testimony of Her regard, by the Institution of an Order of knighthood, whereby Her resolution to take upon Herself the Government of the Territories in India may be commemorated, and by which Her Majesty may be enabled to reward conspicuous merit and loyalty, has been graciously pleased, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to institute, erect, constitute, and create, an Order of Knighthood, to be known by, and have for ever hereafter, the name, style, and designation, of "The Most Exalted Order of the Star of India".

In 1938 he returned to England. When the 1939 Register was taken in the following September he and Friede were located at a property named Amesbury in Wycombe, just seven miles from Princes Risborough, the relevance of which will be revealed below. Among the four others sharing the address at the time of the enumerators visit, one was a Technical Assistant to Research Laboratory, and Mr. Astbury himself, by then 59 years of age, was working as a Civil Engineer. In Column 11 of the record, further detail is provided, which, with a little difficulty, appears to read – Tech. Admin. ARP Dept. Home Office.

Given that the discovery of his post-nominals and the matching appointment to the Order came from two distinct sources, coupled to the content of Column 11 of the Register and his residence close to Princes Risborough, I’d bet my house that he is the author of the R&E history.

The contents of Mr. Astbury's manuscript opened my eyes to an organisation that did much more than accumulate post air-raid statistics. There doesn’t seem to be any aspect of protecting British society in wartime that R&E didn’t touch in a positive manner. They were the reasoning behind Civil Defence, aka Air Raid Precautions. Lives are saved by heroes, so they say, Astbury’s manuscript, without any deliberate attempt to do so, truly supports the counter that not all heroes wear capes, some wear laboratory coats.

What follows is a condensed appraisal of the salient points of R&E's history as recorded and written by Arthur Ralph Astbury.

Air Raid Precautions (Civil Defence) and the creation of R&E

Guernica was all but destroyed on 26 April 1937. In the same month 800,000 volunteers were sought to create the UK’s Air Raid Wardens Service. In December the same year Royal Assent was granted for the Air Raid Precautions Act which became effective on New Years Day 1938. By the middle of the year just a quarter of the required number of wardens had signed up. In the wake of the Munich Crisis in September, a sudden influx boosted the figure by an additional 500,000 volunteers.

Despite the issuing of guidance to the public (the first handbook was published in 1935) based largely on the theoretical considerations of the Bombing Tests sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Home Office Structural Precautions Committee, it wasn’t until February 1939 that the need for greater depth of knowledge through tests and trials culminated in the formation of the Research and Experiments Department of the Home Office, and shortly after being relocated beneath the wing of the Ministry of Home Security.

Within his 700 pages, O’Brien, without citing R&E, alluded to the scope of their influence when he wrote – The reader may be surprised, for instance, at the relatively small proportion of the volume devoted to description of air attacks. The reason is that much more time and effort were spent on preparations for large-scale bombardment than on dealing with the consequences of the bombs themselves.

A substantial chunk of that time and effort was the work undertaken by R&E.

Sir (Dr.) R.E. Stradling, Head of Research and Experiments

Post-war he obtained a post as lecturer in Civil Engineering at the University of Birmingham, before moving to fulfil the role of Head of Civil Engineering at Bradford Technical College in 1922. Two years later he took up the post of Director of Building Research, experimenting on building and road construction. There he remained until 1939 when he was appointed as the head of R&E. His knighthood was received in 1945 in respect of his wartime endeavours – being one of many honours granted both at home and from institutions in America.

Reginald passed away in January 1952, his friend and colleague at R&E, A.J.S. Pippard, summarised an obituary in a civil engineering journal – Stradling’s life was marked by devotion to his work and to his family, and those who were fortunate enough to be able to claim his friendship will ever be grateful for that privilege.

Beginnings, Structure and Evolution of R&E

Before the R&E Department was established, decisions based on theoretical findings by the Bombing Tests and Structural Precautions committees, had compelled some decisions to be made in areas that R&E would imminently inherit. The stirrup-pump, Anderson shelter, trench, basement and surface shelters, and the concept of refuge rooms in dwellinghouses were well advanced, but above all else it was investment in time and materials for protection from war gases that took precedence.

As the scope of the requirement widened, so too did the committees, sub-committees and disparate institutions that emerged in response. The disadvantage of the system of separate agencies was that the ARP Department had priorities, but little control over the focus of the myriad of agencies upon which the work depended, each of which had their own primary interests to attend to. Coupled to this it was suspected that some protective measures being manufactured and marketed commercially, were not fit for purpose, and in the event of aerial attack would not materially reduce loss of life and instead create general panic amid the environment into which emergency elements of the ARP and fire services would respond. A method of standardising and approving commercially available items was required.

Dr. Stradling, serving as the Director of Building Research, was consulted by the Home Office in late 1938 to survey the position and advise on suitable measures. His report led to the establishment of the Research and Experiments Department on 13 February 1939, accommodated at Westminster’s Horseferry House.

Three weeks earlier, Dr. Stradling has been appointed as Chief Scientific Adviser of the imminent department. Reporting directly to the Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Dr. Stradling’s responsibilities were supervision and coordination of all work carried by, or on behalf of R&E, across a wide, and continually evolving range of civil defence matters.

Even with a modest initial staff of 24, it was immediately apparent that R&E’s ability to function was restricted by lack of capacity at Horseferry. By the end of March 1939, they relocated round the corner to Cleland House in John Islip Street, close to the Lambeth Bridge.

Dr. Stradling’s earliest appointments were his senior team, including Arthur Ralph Astbury, drawn from the Chief Engineering Adviser’s Branch to serve as R&E Technical Adviser. Stradling and Astbury were joined by five additional appointees to form the R&E headquarters staff.

HQ staff oversaw the work of the full-time advisers, grouped by subject, fielding many of the nation’s most eminent doctors, professors, and professionals across the range. The full list of sections, sub-sections, committees, sub-committees, and panels forms an incomprehensible list of brilliant minds. Dr. Stradling’s task was to create a workable structure.

By early summer 1940, the work of the department had expanded exponentially, compelling not only a strategic move from the Home Office to the Ministry of Home Security, but the redistribution of resources across a range of twelve definitive Sections. Each Section possessed its own accountabilities and responsibilities, but in many experiments overlapped and worked alongside other Sections to achieve the desired outcome.

R.E.1 – General Administration

Staff appointments, billeting, supplies, processing leave and travel claims, staff cars and petrol coupons, telephones, and all matters connected to expenditure.

R.E.2 – Control of Research

With the exception of matters connected to chemical and camouflage, R.E.2 was responsible for oversight and supervision of every research programme. Any other Section requiring tests or investigations be carried out were to first seek sanction from R.E.2.

R.E.3 – Chemical Research

Chemical research was wide and varied but concentrated principally on matters connected to war gases – detection, protective clothing, respirators and materials, decontamination, protection of foodstuffs from war gases, air filtration for shelters, anti-gas ointments – in addition to sandbag preservation, paints for road marking, firefighting foams, and associated Home Office certification and mark schemes.

R.E.4 – Technical Development (other than chemical)

R.E.4 focussed on window protection, structural alterations in vital factories, protection of plant, ventilation of shelters, advice on materials and shelter schemes, and drafting of handbooks and memoranda for publication.

R.E.5 – Electrical

Security of electricity supply, protection of electrical plant, distribution, and use of electricity.

R.E. 6 – Technical Intelligence and Liaison

R.E.6 was responsible for the network of officers that conducted post-raid fieldwork, Regional Technical Investigating Officers and subordinate TIO’s, those being the individuals that attended the sites of air raid attacks to produce reports (as featured in the relevant pages of this website). In addition, R.E.6 worked with foreign intelligence, Passive Air Defence (PAD) sections of other government offices, and in the production and filing of publications and records.

 

The above six Sections of R&E were augmented in 1941-42 by the addition of the following.

R.E.7 – Fire Research

R.E.7, also known as ‘F’ Division, dealt with all matters relating to fires, fire protection and firefighting, most notably in response to the German use of mass incendiary devices dropped from the air.

R.E.8 – Appreciation (from November 1941)

R.E.8 was formed in November 1941 to study the general effect of air attack on structures. Eight months after formation, its role was amended to that below.

R.E.8 – Operational Research (from July 1942)

The main thrust for a shift in focus of R.E.8’s role, was the benefit to the fighting forces of knowledge gained concerning the effect on structures of various bombs and bombing techniques. Turning conclusions of defensive investigation into useful data for offensive purposes brought R.E.8 into the fore and compelled liaison with Air Staff, the Admiralty, and the War Office.

R.E.9 – Armaments (from March 1942)

R.E.9’s responsibilities were many, centred on the theme of identifying enemy armaments, operational and feasible use, and assimilating understanding for offensive interests. Additionally, R.E.9, having been granted use of an outbuilding at Princes Risborough, accumulated bomb fragments, many of which were rebuilt in full, and displayed in what was effectively a museum of great operational interest to many parties. As a consequence of this, and the Section’s expanding technical knowledge of the subject, lectures were delivered to Ministry of Home Security schools and civil defence establishments. The Section also generated and distributed Enemy Aircraft Armament Notices to field staff and other interested departments.

R.E.10 – Lighting

The Air Raid Precautions Act 1937, made it incumbent on the nation to restrict lighting, reinforced with greater detail in the Lighting (Restrictions) Order 1939. R.E.10 worked to formalise this need and with the British Standard Institution established a number of specifications within the BS/ARP series. This involved the provision of lighting for large industrial complexes vital to the war effort, through the range of commercial and dwellinghouse needs, through to handheld torches and bicycle lights – plus responding to public queries connected to lighting, in particular ventilation of homes during the blackout.

R.E.11 – Publications and Records

R.E.11 were effectively the librarians of all documents generated by, or required by the department.

R.E.12 – Statistics

Enumeration of bomb explosions and casualties. Evidencing the relationship between bombing, casualty numbers and dispersal of persons to inform future evacuation and shelter planning.

R&E Sections at Work

Mr. Astbury’s reflection of the work of the R&E Department was represented across 20 chapters, beginning with several dedicated to its roots, formation, and responsibilities, before revealing the work and outcomes achieved across the various subjects. What follows is a precis of the salient points.

Chapter 9 of the history of R&E, ‘Physics of Explosions’ provides a substantial explanation of the factors of exploding bombs and how they were studied in both theory and practice. Acknowledging that an ounce of TNT contains roughly the same energy as the same mass of coal, and that the only difference is the rate at which the energy is released, Astbury describes the practical and theoretical analysis undertaken to understand the effect of blast, shock-wave (positive and negative), and earth-shock.

In Astbury’s words – As the effect of earthshock was known to be influenced by the nature of the soil between the bomb and the shelter, it was necessary to carry out full-scale experiments at selected places where typical soils existed. The principal tests were conducted on the chalk soil of Larkhill on Salisbury Plain, and the sandy loam of Blackbank near Carlisle. Piezo-electric gauges with oscillograph units were used to record measurements.

Unsurprisingly it was discovered that the rate of earth movement in sub-surface explosions was considerably less than that of air displacement when exploding on or above the surface. However, the force of mass earth movement rendered existing pre-cast sub-surface shelters vulnerable to collapse through inward movement of a wall, leaving roof members unsupported, or the roof members being lifted, leaving the walls unsupported and pushed inside the shelter by the earth. Even lengthy trench systems of a similar build, which were thought to afford added integrity by the provision of compartmentalisation, were shown to collapse throughout when subjected to the same reaction.

By chance of testing, R&E discovered that surface shelters which were nominally afforded a damp course, suffered a particular vulnerability in that a blast insufficient to destruct the walls, would literally slide the structure off the damp course. In response R&E designed a pre-formed concrete box-form of shelter that was designed to slide as a whole, thus absorbing the energy of the blast without catastrophic effect. They also proved that existing surface shelters could be modified with a course of hessian impregnated with bitumen emulsion that greatly reduced the potential for sliding.

The problems of anti-scatter in a domestic environment were multiplied when addressing glazing in the commercial world, and that of vital industries that operated in factory buildings with roof lights. Various bracings and reinforced framing were trialled and tested, but resulted in the unsatisfactory result that improving the integrity of glass in the frame only increased the likelihood of the frame and glass as a whole being ejected at speed from the aperture. Such adaptations were substantial and costly in terms of material and manpower, leaving Mr. Astbury to conclude – such systems have no practical value.

What is especially interesting concerning R&E’s operations, is that they were as willing to engage directly with public opinion as much as with concerns emanating from authority. The effect of glass in the early bombing campaigns was a profound example, as casualty numbers were greatly increased by the number of those injured by high-speed fragments of glass. Mr. Astbury reflects that it was queries from the public concerning the potential for replacement of glass with a less brittle alternative that compelled a new line of inquiry. If everyone had consistently re-glazed at once, window glass might have become scarce… ingenuity was shown in pressing into service such makeshift materials as galvanised steel sheet, linoleum, tarred felt, cardboard, varnished cotton fabrics, plasterboard, and even oiled paper. If some of these kept out daylight, at least they made the blackout easier.

However the commercial world was quick to seize on an opportunity, and a variety of alternatives swamped the market. In September 1940, R&E collected a total of 360 samples from the marketplace and began trials. From the perspective of manufacturers, many of whom willingly sent samples of their product for testing, R&E in undertaking its wartime remit, were providing a free testing and approval service. The hundreds of samples were grouped into five categories, (i) Plastic film with metal reinforcement; (ii) Plastic film with textile netting reinforcement; (iii) Plastic film without reinforcement; (iv) Impregnated fabrics; (v) Waterproofed papers.

All samples were first tested to exposure of natural conditions before moving on to the blast stage – which some did not achieve through process of delamination. The outcomes, which would have been of great interest to the inquiring public, were rightly subjected to a comparative cost/performance factor. Eventually 130 of the original 360 samples received departmental certification.

Lighting was another subject that took up a substantial amount of time and resources. The ARP Act 1937 made it incumbent on the Home Office to issue regulations regarding lighting restrictions – the Lighting (Restrictions) Order 1098/1939 was the result.

The Order required complete screening of all interior light and reduction of exterior lighting to the absolute minimum necessary for the continuance of work of national importance. In addition, Section 43 of the Civil Defence Act placed the responsibility on the occupiers of factory premises and owners of mines, to obscure internal lighting and extinguish external lighting except where proven to be of vital need.

R&E found that attempts to experiment with lighting by aerial surveillance was fraught with several disadvantages, both technically and practically. With specialist assistance provided by the Research Laboratories of the General Electric Co., a laboratory method was designed using dual projection lanterns. The National Physical Laboratory also contributed with ideas and tests of their own. In all, 14 standards were issued in the BS/ARP series related to lighting. As with other pro-active measures, the needs of the nation’s safety were finely balanced with the desire for as much of normal life to continue. This ethos runs like a vein through all of R&E’s considerations, proving by test and technical analysis that contrary to the opinions of some, Government wasn’t locking down society unnecessarily.

Astbury’s book revealed the voluntary recruitment of a Corps of Honorary Fire Observers. At ‘F’ Divisions request, the Corps of HFOs were an assembly of scientific and technically qualified men, mostly occupying senior posts at universities and in industry, who were willing to attend and study the behaviour of fires as they developed. Lines of study were not prescribed, deliberately allowing the learned professionals to make their own approach and study lines of interest they discovered.

The National Fire Service College, Saltdean, with the NFS standard flying above the requisitioned Grand Ocean Hotel.

Arrangements were made for NFS control rooms to advise the HFO of developing situations. Contact between Churchill’s Heroes with Grimy Faces and the professional academics of HFO was reported to be good and of mutual benefit. The willingness and capability of these highly qualified men to communicate with the grass roots of the fire service was evidenced in their ability to engage freely with officers and firemen during and post-incident. They realised it was the men at the front, the branch operators and those supporting them, that could best describe the development of the fire and the effect of their firefighting efforts.

Some members of the Corps extended their voluntary activities to deliver lectures and demonstrations to NFS units across the nation. When the Fire Service College was established in the requisitioned Grand Ocean Hotel at Saltdean, HFO conferences were held in conjunction with senior NFS staff.

In the first twelve months of HFO activity, July 1942 to July 1943, an average of two major fires were attended by an HFO (or multiple HFOs) each week. Alongside K.433 fire reports completed by officers of the NFS, HFO reports furnished R&E with analytical scientific studies of raid fires involving food stores, flour mills, magnesium grinding factories, film stores, ships’ holds, paper mills, packing-case factories, gas works, theatres, garages, churches, ordnance stores and a tin box factory. The depth and scope of the HFOs work was to prove of inestimable value during, and after the war, and for many years beyond.

It is interesting to note that whilst the threat of high explosive bombs remained of primary interest in terms of protecting the civil population, all involved in fire research appreciated that the greatest loss of the built environment, including vital manufacturing, was affected by the proliferation of incendiary devices, with or without exploding noses. Such was the volume that the Luftwaffe were capable of dropping simultaneously that only the vaguest estimate could be made of the numbers. R&E’s ‘B’ Division (Intelligence Branch) selected defined small areas for study during raids, in which every single incendiary bomb dropped was logged, with its timing, position, distance from its neighbouring device, and effect recorded and analysed.

Camouflage, Smoke and Decoy

The roof of the Rolls Royce factory in Derby as designed by artist Ernest Townsend to look from the air like rows of terraced housing.

Modified orchard heaters being prepared and lined up ready for use in Carlton Road, Derby, 1940.

Decoy research was undertaken in relation to screening, but in such a way that not only distracted enemy bombers from real targets but tempted them to release their payloads on elaborate hoaxes.

In this endeavour R&E, having no direct authority for aviation support vital to conduct aerial observations of trials, found progress was repeatedly thwarted by the Air Ministry. For their part the Ministry had already conducted research for their own purposes, and by July 1940 were working on dummy day and dummy night aerodromes. In the same month an interdepartmental meeting between the Home Office and three service departments the Air Ministry conceded to set up a Directorate under the supervision of Colonel Sir J.F. Turner, C.B., D.S.O, for the purposes of assisting in the development of decoy (and smoke screening) for civil defence purposes).

Hand drawn map of an elaborate RAF aerodrome decoy near the village of Clearbrook, Devon.

It's intent was to distract the Luftwaffe from the actual location of RAF Harrowbeer. 

The Ministry’s involvement was key, given that by August 1940 they had established 56 ‘Q’ sites (night dummy aerodromes) and 36 ‘K’ sites (day dummy aerodromes). Under co-ordination of the new Directorate the Air Ministry requested that all further experimental work on decoys, required by any of the services, was undertaken by the Ministry of Home Security; i.e. R&E.

The Ministry of Home Security was required to identify a priority list of vital points for civil decoy requirements. One of the earliest experiments of this need was the use of lights to create, by night, a reproduction of certain features of Sheffield and Chesterfield extending over a length of three miles on hills to the south-west of the former. Left in place to measure the effect, R&E recorded that it collected a number of high explosive hits (no figure provided). This provided some assurance that the cleverly poised lighting, arranged to represent dummy blast furnaces, marshalling yards, and factory lighting, had duped at least some pilots and bomb aimers.

Fire was used to simulate dummy oil tank fires. Studies of actual raids showed how pilots were prone to home in on fires on the assumption they were caused by bombs dropped by formation leaders earlier in an attack. Concrete lined circles in excavated rural ground, filled with flaming oil, proved tempting targets. Much of what was undertaken fell under the codename Starfish, and today the remains of sites are identified as Starfish sites.

In 1941, ambiguously, R&E’s involvement in this aspect of civil defence ceased. In his historical reflection Mr. Astbury states – The Mabane Committee recommended that research, experiment, and development on decoys should be carried out by the Air Ministry. With the adoption of this recommendation in September 1941, the activities of the department in this field ended.

Astbury’s explanation appears clear, until reading a contradictory copy of Ministry of Home Security minutes from the same month (held at the National Archives) that stated - In September 1941 the Camouflage Committee and the Technical Sub-Committee were disbanded following a recommendation of the Mabane Committee on Concealment and Deception that a new Camouflage Committee should be established under the control of the new Directorate of Camouflage of the Ministry of Home Security.

Whatever the fact, R&E appears to have not undertaken any further part in the deployment of decoys for civil defence.

Summary

On 28 March 1945 the air raid warning sounded in London for the last time and a day later the final flying bomb fell, 2,109 days since the first ordnance was dropped on Hoy, Orkney Islands, on 17 October 1939.

Perhaps Mr. Astbury’s manuscript was unfinished when locked away until a year before his death and received little or no attention since 1972. There is no concluding chapter, no summary of R&E’s achievements and no reference to its demise.

In May 1945, in the immediate aftermath of Victory in Europe, the Ministry of Home Security, R&E’s parent organisation, was dissolved. In a timeline of key events detailed at the beginning of his book, the last entry merely states – 1 September (1945) The Ministry of Works assumes responsibility for the work of the department.

Barely had the VE Day and VJ Day, revelry and relief subsided and an opportunity for normalcy embraced, when the world was thrown into the uncertainty of the Cold War. This unwelcome turn of events no doubt heightened rather than lessened the need for the continued work of an organisation responsible for research and experiments into civil defence. I clearly recall around the time I became a teenager, distribution of the Protect and Survive pamphlets that contained suggestions for families to create refuges in their homes, some of which differed little to the advice given to households of the 1940’s – but most of all the threat of nuclear war spread not hope and practicality, but doom and fear.

If the R&E, 1939-1945, was responsible for producing public information pamphlets during that conflict, there must have been (and in all likelihood still be) a descendant organisation. But it is hard to imagine in this modern world, with our apparent increased liberties and access to information, that any comparable organisation would so genuinely place the needs of the nation and its populace so firmly to the fore to the extent that R&E were contactable and attentive to fears expressed by the mass or the individual.

Having read Mr. Astbury’s manuscript, absorbed the complexity and scope of the work they undertook, and compared this with records and anecdotes of the effect their work had during the nations toughest trial, I have nothing but admiration for them.

Further reading

For those who wish to read Mr. Astbury's manuscript in full, there is no need to visit the National Archives. I have transcribed and represented the entire work, including all diagrams and photographs within the IWFBF range of publications available at Blurb HERE. As usual all profits are forwarded to the Firefighters Charity. 

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